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ABSTRACT
In this study, we attempt to verify if the funds constituting the
(quasi)mandatory capital pillar of the Polish pension system
outperformed the market in the 2014–2016 period. This research
objective was raised a few times in the past, but nowadays it
gains a new context. In our research the sample starts at the
moment when a set of regulations was implemented to facilitate
competition among funds, which should further translate into
improved portfolio results. Analysing the monthly data, we
employ the Performance Change Measurement approach of
Grinblatt and Titman (1993) to address the question of the invest-
ment outcomes. Despite the fact that the relatively short period is
verified, we do not find any convincing proof of the superior
portfolio performance under the new regulatory framework.
Consequently, we argue that further changes should be oriented
toward fund fee reduction rather than motivating managers to
greater analytical effort.
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1. Introduction
Pension fund performance measurement has been intensively discussed in the
academic literature both on a theoretical and empirical basis. This question gains
additional importance in the case of (quasi)mandatory pension funds (PFs), which
are part of the public pension system (2nd pillar). We should be aware that eventual
underperformance may undermine political support for PFs as well as general
confidence in the system.
This paper provides portfolio performance assessment of 2nd pillar PFs operating
in the Polish market. In particular, rather than creating a ranking of PFs, we address
whether the PF managers were able to systematically outperform the market. This
issue was raised a few times in the past, but due to the major regulatory shifts that
took place in 2014, we argue it requires further investigation. We also contribute to
the literature by employing the Performance Change Measurement (PCM) approach
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of Grinblatt and Titman (1993), which may overcome a few of the shortcomings of
other frequently used measures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief over-
view of recent changes in the pension system landscape in Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) with a special focus on the Polish case to highlight the relevance of the research
question investigated in this paper. Section 3 surveys the literature. Section 4 describes
our methodological approach and data. Section 5 reports the empirical outcomes.
Section 6 provides some general conclusions that may be applicable to other countries.
2. Pension system in Poland and the recent reforms in CEE region
Following the policy recommendations from the seminal (World Bank, 1994) report,
since the late 90s’ the Central and Eastern European (CEE) governments started the
fundamental reforms of their pension systems. Two general regulatory trends could
be noted.
Firstly, the defined contribution rule (DC) has been introduced which could be
recognized as a milestone in challenging the population ageing problem. According
to this rule the pension contributions have been no longer recognized as taxes but
have become the individual savings from the system participants’ perspective. This
naturally should create an incentive to delay the decision to exit the labour market,
as every additional contribution paid means higher pension benefit received.
Secondly, the multipillar mandatory (public) system has been established. Before,
the public system was solely a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) type (1st pillar). This means
that the taxes or contributions paid by working age generation were directly paid to
retirees. Therefore, the whole mandatory system was driven by labour market trends
and was especially prone to political risk. To diversify the aforementioned risk factors
the capital (2nd pillar) has been introduced, where the pension receivables take
the form of financial securities. Consequently, different sources of risks could be
recognized there. Moreover, establishing the mandatory capital pillar was to support
the development of the local financial market, if the pension contributions were
allocated into domestic securities. This externality could be especially beneficial for
the catching-up economies like the CEE ones. Nevertheless, the policymakers had to
account also for other potential consequences of domestic vs. foreign allocation, like
the emergence of speculative bubble or the depreciation of local currency. It is not
surprising that due to different economic conditions the CEE states established a
highly diversified policy framework in this matter, which is summarized in Table 1.




and 2nd pillar [1st/2nd pillar
in percentage points of the gross salary] Foreign assets in the second 2nd
Estonia 16/6 No limits for EFTA and CEFTA countries
Hungary 18,5/8 30 % cap on foreign securities.
Latvia 12/8 No limits for EFTA and CEFTA countries
Poland 12,22/7,3 5 % cap on foreign securities.
Romania 25,5/2 No limits for UE and EEA countries.
Source: Own study based on Chybalski (2011b) and Rajevska (2013).
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Finally, we should be aware that setting up the mandatory capital pillar, while
keeping the pension contribution constant, meant a loss of budgetary revenues as
part of the contribution was transferred to pension funds. This financing gap was to
be covered by some fiscal adjustment or privatization revenues. However, after about
a decade of experiences we know, these assumptions were overly optimistic, as this
discrepancy was mainly financed by the additional public debt. It was then unsurpris-
ing that after the eruption of the global financial crisis in 2007, the policy approach
to the capital pillar changed radically. Due to the worsening conditions of public
finance, the governments decided to limit the size of their capital pillars (Table 2).
The aforementioned policy trends shaped also the structure of the Polish pension
system. The fundamental reform was implemented in 1999; two mandatory and one
voluntary pillar were established. The 1st pillar operates on a non-financial1 defined
contribution (NDC) basis, i.e., the members’ contributions are recorded in individual
accounts; hence, they may be treated like claims on the government. In the 2nd
mandatory pillar, the individual accounts have also been settled, but the financial
assets are collected here (FDC). The 2nd pillar is formed by Open Pension Funds
(OFE) managed by private companies. The 3rd pillar, also of FDC type, offers supple-
mentary occupational schemes or voluntary pension savings, which are facilitated by
some tax deductions. In the decumulation phase, the value of retirement benefits
from the public system (1st and 2nd pillar) is calculated as a total value of assets
divided by the expected lifetime in months.
In Poland, the contribution to the public pension system has been settled at the
level of 19.52% of gross salary, where 12.22% was initially transferred to the 1st pillar
and the remaining 7.3% to the 2nd pillar. Since 2011, the 2nd pillar contribution has
been reduced from 7.3% to 2.3%, with a possible increase to 3.5% in 2017 and
beyond. However, in 2014, the government made the contribution to the capital pillar
(quasi)mandatory. This means that individuals may decide if his or her contribution
is split between two pillars or is transferred to the 1st pillar alone. The default option
became the transfer of the whole contribution to the 1st pillar. It is not surprising
(Blake, 2006, p. 224) that after employing the NDC as a default option, only about
15% of individuals decided to continue the partial transfer to FDC. However,
the issue of 2nd pillar portfolios management did not lose its importance, as the
remaining majority (85%) of labour population still possess the assets accumulated by
the PFs.
The division of the contribution and the issue of voluntariness were not the end of
the regulatory shifts in the 2nd pillar. In February 2014, the government decided to
Table 2. Post-crisis reduction of 2nd pillar contribution in the selected CEE countries.
Country
Historical 2nd pillar
contribution Weakening of the 2nd pillar in the post-crisis period
Estonia 6% Contribution suspended between 2009 and 2011.
Hungary 8% Nationalized in 2011.
Latvia 8% Till 2012 reduced temporarily to 2%. Then, gradually increased.
Poland 7,3% Reduced to 2.3%. Since 2014 it is 2.92% but it is not mandatory.
Romania 2% Postponed planned increase in second pillar contribution in 2010, but
reintroduced in 2011. In 2017 the contribution rate was 5.1%
Source: Own study based on Chybalski (2011b), Schwarz (2011) and OECD (2015).
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exchange Polish T-bonds into the social security (NDC) records and simultaneously
excluded government securities from the list of investable assets. The previously
established cap on local equities became a floor at the 75% level (then,
gradually decreasing every year), and the cap on foreign securities started to be
gradually increased from the 5% level. Figure 1 exhibits the aggregated OFEs portfolio
on January, 31st 2014, just before the aforementioned regulatory shifts;
Another important change was the abandonment of the internal benchmark, which
was calculated as the weighted average of OFEs performance. This solution has been
copied from the Chilean pension system and can be also found in Bulgaria, Croatia
and Romania (Kawinski, Stanko, & Rutecka, 2012). In the case of Poland, superior
performance was rewarded a special premium, and the eventual underperformance
was penalized. OFEs were obliged to provide to its members the minimum guaran-
teed rate of return, defined as the minimum of two values: 50% of the benchmark or
the benchmark deducted by 4 percentage points. If the OFE did not succeed, the
discrepancy had to be covered by the OFE’s management firm. However, this system
did not facilitate any competition among the OFEs, and the phenomenon of herding
was identified (Kominek, 2006). Put simply OFEs investment behaviour was mainly
driven by the threat of a severe penalty, which depended on relative underperform-
ance; hence, OFEs were mimicking the moves of the largest players in this market.
Therefore, this system gained a lot of criticism (Departament Nadzoru Inwestycji
Emerytalnych, 2012), and an external benchmark has been established since 2014.
Its structure was app. 80% of the local equity market index (WIG) and 20% of the
local interbank market rate (WIBOR3Mþ 50 b.p.). It is important to note that this
benchmark had only an informative character. To eliminate regulatory pressure on
herding behaviour, the penalty mechanism was radically changed; it gained an
external character – the underperformance measure is now related to the 6-year
inflation rate for the Polish economy. Keeping also in mind the significant changes in
Figure 1. Aggregated OFEs portfolio structure as on 31st, January 2014.
Source: own study based on Polish Financial Supervision Authority data (https://www.knf.gov.pl/Images/2014_01_
czesc_A_tcm75-36989.xls)
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the investment limits, we believe that the question of OFEs performance
measurement has gained a new context and deserves further verification.
3. Literature review
There are numerous works investigating the abnormal returns of PFs in the
developed economies, and here we present just a few of them. For the UK, Blake and
Board (2000) identified significant underperformance, while Thomas and Tonks
(2001) found no significant divergence from market indices for 2,175 funds in the
period 1983–1997. Mixed results have also been achieved for PFs operating in the US
market. Lakonishok et al. (1992) analysed the quarterly returns of 769 equity PFs of a
defined benefit (DB) type and identified average underperformance similarly to the
earlier study of Ippolito and Turner (1987). On the other hand Andonov, Bauer, and
Cremers (2012) found a positive and statistically significant outperformance for a
sample of large US and Canadian PFs2.
Due to the relatively short history, there are just a few studies investigating the
investment results of PFs operating in the CEE. The underperformance of PFs was
noted in case of Latvia and Estonia (Lieksnis, 2010) and Slovakia (Mestan, Kubaska,
& Kralik, 2016), while mixed results were delivered for Croatia (Matek, Lukac, &
Repac, 2015) and Lithuania (Kabasinskas, Sutien_e, Milos, & Valakevicius, 2017).
Moving to the market of our interest, Stanko (2003) was the first to challenge this
dilemma for Poland. Using monthly data for the period June 1999 to March 2003
(Stanko, 2003), the approaches of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and
Merton (1981) were employed to identify the roots of PFs performance. The two
aforementioned models can resolve if the observed performance is due to the security
selection or market timing ability. This first skill applies to micro-forecasting (the
manager can pick outperforming securities within the same asset class), while the
second one applies to macro-forecasting (the manager can adjust the portfolio beta
due to the forecasted market trends). In fact, Stanko (2003) identified that both of
these premia were positive and statistically significant. A similar methodology was
also utilized by Bohl, Lischewski, and Voronkova (2011). Using the extended sample
ending in 2007, Bohl et al. (2011) did not find any superior performance by Polish
pension funds, while in the Hungarian case, significant underperformance was noted.
Analysing monthly data for the period up to August 2013, Frasyniuk-Pietrzyk and
Pietrzyk (2014) again did not identify any significant outperformance of Polish PFs,
but in a few cases, a positive selection premium was noted. Therefore, only Stanko
(2003) argued that OFEs were able to beat the market. Nevertheless, we should keep
in mind that Stanko (2003) investigated relatively short sample, which makes it
more likely to observe the eventual outperformance, even if the asset returns are
purely random.
Despite the popularity of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and Merton
(1981), we should be aware that there are always controversies around the selection
of an appropriate asset pricing model. Therefore, it is worth mentioning the simula-
tion performed by Sławinski and Tymoczko (2013). In this case, the idea was basic:
to observe the performance of the hypothetical pension fund managed passively and
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compare it with the PF results. This hypothetical portfolio had the same structure as
the average PF, and its rate of return was determined by market proxies of the
respective asset classes. The objective of Sławinski and Tymoczko (2013) was to
examine if the PFs can beat passively managed portfolios. Therefore, assuming fees
typical of the passive management industry (0.1% fee on assets, no contribution fee),
Sławinski and Tymoczko (2013) reported surprising results. The hypothetical
portfolio performance was better not only relative to the PF portfolio with the true
level of fees (0.6% fee on assets, 4% contribution fee), but it outperformed the PF
portfolio without any fees charged. Consequently, Sławinski and Tymoczko (2013)
recommended a regulatory shift toward passive management. However, this conclu-
sion should be treated with some caution as in the analysed period, the internal
minimum guaranteed rate of return mechanism was still in use, which could
significantly constrain active management of PF portfolios.
4. Methodology and data
In order to verify PF performance in the new regulatory environment, we have
decided to employ the Grinblatt and Titman (1993) approach. Contrary to the
aforementioned measures, it is not related to any asset pricing model. Instead,
Grinblatt and Titman (1993) classify the investors into two groups: uninformed and
informed. The uninformed perceive the vector of assets’ expected returns as constant,
while for informed investors, this vector is time varying. Informed investors
can benefit from this knowledge by increasing (decreasing) the particular portfolio
holdings for which expected returns will increase (decrease). If the informed investors
perform the correct portfolio adjustment, the covariance between the asset class
weight and its conditional return will be positive (Grauer 2008, p. 47). Therefore, a




rit witwi;t1ð Þ (1)
where rit is the monthly (from period t to t þ 1) rate of return on i-th asset and
wit and wi;t1 are the weights of asset i at time t and t þ 1, respectively.









In order to verify if an investor is outperforming the market, we run the t-test:





where T is the number of time points. The null hypothesis states that an abnormal
return is zero, while the alternative states that the investor can outperform the
market. Therefore, the one-tailed test is used.
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It should be mentioned that the Grinblatt and Titman (1993) concept has been
utilized in the works of Grauer (2008), Bhattacharjee and Roy (2012) and Clare,
Sherman and Thomas (2016) for mutual fund performance analysis.
The monthly portfolio data investigated in this paper cover the period from
February 2014 to December 2016 for 12 pension funds (OFE)3, which constitute the
Polish (quasi)mandatory capital pension pillar. In the monthly portfolio reports, only
aggregated numbers for particular asset classes can be found. Therefore, according to
Figure 2, we have distinguished 3 types of assets for further investigation, i.e., equities
listed on the local market4, equities listed on foreign markets and bank deposits in
local currency. For these three classes, we employed the appropriate proxies of rit . In
case of local equities, the broad market index WIG was used. Foreign equities returns
have been proxied by the MSCI World Index representing large and mid-cap stocks
across 23 developed markets. As the MSCI Index is presented on a USD basis, we
have multiplied its values by the USD/PLN spot exchange rate. According to existing
regulations, OFEs are not allowed to use any currency hedging derivatives, so this
step is necessary to correctly present the funds’ perspective. In the case of bank
deposits, we have used the 1-month interbank PLN market rate (WIBOR 1M). The
analysed asset classes comprise app. 90% of the portfolio. We have decided to exclude
corporate debt from our analysis (app. 5%) as this market segment is highly illiquid
and still lacks a well-grounded benchmark. OFE portfolio holdings reports have been
obtained from the Polish Financial Supervision Authority website, while the source of
market proxy data was Reuters Datastream.
5. Empirical results
We start our verification process from the assessment of interdependence between
OFEs returns. To deliver meaningful sample estimates of correlation coefficients we
need to verify the stationarity of the investigated series first. Consequently, we employ
Figure 2. OFEs portfolio structure as on 30th, December 2016.
Source: own study based on Polish Financial Supervision Authority data. (https://www.knf.gov.pl/Images/OFE_dane_
mies_201612_tcm75-49032.xls)
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two tests for this purpose: Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkowski–
Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS). In case of ADF test the null hypothesis states that
series has a unit root (variable is not stationary), while the null of KPPS states that
variable is stationary. The use of both tests should support the robustness of the
results, as the ADF is known to have rather low power. The test statistics for both of
the tests have been presented in Tables 3 and 4.
We observe that for both intervals the results of the tests are highly consistent. In
case of 1month frequency data, ADF rejects the null any time at 1% level, while
KPSS delivers the same conclusions. For 3months frequency only in three cases the
significance level of ADF test is greater than 1%, but any time lower than 10%.
Therefore, we are able to run the correlation analysis.
The correlation estimates presented in Table 4 indicate very high level of
co-movement between OFEs returns. The divergence of OFEs performance can be
also evaluated on the risk-adjusted basis. For this purpose we have calculated the





where Rp is the mean portfolio return, Rf mean risk-free rate and rp is the port-
folio return standard deviation of the j OFE. The results of these estimates have been
presented in the second column of the Table 5.
We notice that the Sharpe ratios for the analysed portfolios are quite similar and




where rSRj denotes standard deviation of the Sharp ratios and SRj its mean value,
is rather limited reaching only 0,25 value. Using Sharpe ratio it is also possible to
employ the Opdyke (2007) test to verify if the difference between the selected pair
of Sharpe ratios is statistically significant. Testing the Sharpe ratios of two portfolios
(A and B) the null hypothesis states H0 : SRA ¼ SRB, against the alternative
Table 3. ADF and KPSS tests of OFE returns.
j-th OFE ADF KPSS
AEGON OFE 4,9679 0,1647
Allianz Polska OFE 5,3624 0,1403
Aviva OFE Aviva BZ WBK 5,0046 0,1508
AXA OFE 5,2188 0,1467
Generali OFE 5,1978 0,1510
MetLife OFE 5,076 0,1354
Nationale-Nederlanden OFE 5,5246 0,1366
Nordea OFE 5,1967 0,1467
Pekao OFE 5,2441 0,1501
PKO BP Bankowy OFE 5,1380 0,1461
OFE Pocztylion 5,4377 0,1301
OFE PZU Złota Jesien 5,4176 0,1383
Note:  - significant at 1%,  - significant at 5%,  - significant at 10%.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ha : SRA 6¼ SRB. The distribution for the null is normal with zero mean and the
following variance:







































rA; rB – standard deviation for A and B respectively,
rAB – covariance of A and B returns,
l3A; l3B – 3rd central moment for A and B respectively,
l4A; l4B – 4th central moment for A and B respectively,
l2A;2B ¼ E RAE RAð Þð Þ2 RBE RBð Þð Þ2
  
;
l1B;2A ¼ E RBE RBð Þð Þ RAE RAð Þð Þ2
 
;
l1A;2B ¼ E RAE RAð Þð Þ RBE RBð Þð Þ2
 
:
Once we take the difference between the top performance (0,1451) and the
worst one (0,0432) according to Sharpe ratio for the investigated sample, we find it
statistically significant only at the 10% level (p-value is 0,0911). If we wished to
exclude the outlier from the sample and test the difference between the top (0,1451)
and the restricted (0,0763) bottom result, the difference becomes insignificant even at
10% level (p-value is 0,2782). Consequently, the correlation estimates and Sharpe ratio
analysis reveal that the objective of the new regulations, i.e., enhancing the investment
competition between OFEs, has not been achieved.
This result is supported also by (Marcinkiewicz, 2015), where the similarity of
the portfolios in the new regulatory environment was assessed by employing the






AEGON OFE 0,1015 0,0143 1,2886 0,8968
Allianz Polska OFE 0,1263 0,0119 1,2547 0,1092
Aviva OFE Aviva BZ WBK 0,1108 0,0001 0,0099 0,4960
AXA OFE 0,1451 0,0035 0,5430 0,2954
Generali OFE 0,0432 0,0142 2,2632 0,0152
MetLife OFE 0,1386 0,0030 0,2886 0,3873
Nationale-Nederlanden OFE 0,0763 0,0072 0,9494 0,1746
Nordea OFE 0,1193 0,0075 1,4525 0,0779
Pekao OFE 0,0858 0,0033 0,6971 0,2453
PKO BP Bankowy OFE 0,1398 0,0041 0,7833 0,2195
OFE Pocztylion 0,1108 0,0003 0,0232 0,4908
OFE PZU Złota Jesien 0,1183 0,0028 0,3958 0,3474
Note:  - significant at 5% level,  - significant at 10% level.
Source: own study based on Polish Financial Supervision Authority data.
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taxonomic analysis framework. On the other hand, it would be hard to expect large
diversity in the investment policy, as 75% floor limit for local equities was applied
that time. Nevertheless, Marcinkiewicz (2015) did not address the clue question
of our interest, i.e. whether the OFEs outperformed the market. For this reason, we
have tested if the PCMs for particular OFEs are greater than zero. The results are
presented in Table 5.
Despite the fact, that the relatively short sample has been analysed, in the vast
majority of cases (10 out of 12) the PCM values have been found to be insignificant
at the 10% level This means the OFEs have been unable to adjust their portfolio
structure to take an advantage from the market trends.
To sum up, the carried analysis has enabled us to formulate two general conclu-
sions. Firstly, the OFEs performance is to large extent similar. Secondly the evidence
on the superior results of OFEs relative to the market performance is still missing.
Both of these findings should have some meaning for the regulatory policies.
6. Conclusions
This study supports the results obtained in earlier works by Bohl et al. (2011) and
Frasyniuk-Pietrzyk and Pietrzyk (2014), but we contribute to the existing body of
knowledge be analysing OFEs portfolio choices in the period of the new regulatory
environment (2014–2016). Therefore, we conclude that the new rules were not
sufficient to facilitate greater competition in the area of investment policy. There may
be two general explanations for this finding.
OFEs may not try to beat the market, which may be due to various reasons. The
international evidence, e.g., Queisser (1998) and Chybalski (2011a) clearly reveal that
individuals select the PF not on the basis of its past investment performance but by
PF marketing activities (advertising, promotional gifts). Hence, there is no motivation
for PFs to beat the market.
It is also possible that OFEs engage in the closet indexing phenomenon which
means that managers try to mimic market indices, which are the benchmarks for
their individual remuneration. Unlike passive management, it is an inexplicit strategy,
as managers do not usually purchase the same securities that comprise the market
index, but they mimic the weights of stocks in particular sectors. Consequently, the
official strategy is an active one, but the fund charges higher fees than under a purely
passive style. Following the results of the Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and Starks (2016)
study, closet indexing is more likely to happen in the countries where explicit indexed
funds are less popular, which resembles Polish market conditions. Currently in the
Polish second pillar none of the PFs is explicitly passive, but in the region some of
the PFs officially declare passive strategy, e.g. in Latvia5 or Slovakia6.
The other option is simply that OFEs are unable to beat the market due to the
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). According to this fundamental concept, the
investors are unable to systematically outperform the market, as the security prices
reflect all available information. Consequently, the prices react only to the unexpected
information which means that they will follow a random walk process (Fama, 1970).
In fact, numerous studies confirmed the unpredictability of asset returns for Polish
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(Potocki & Swist, 2012) and international, e.g., (Cheung & Lai, 1995), (Borges,
2010), markets.
Consequently, the regulator should reconsider its policy. If OFEs cannot beat the
market indices, the protocols should be oriented toward reducing the charged fees.
One solution can be the aforementioned passive management. In the case of Poland
and other CEE countries, there is also an additional argument supporting this index
tracking approach: passive management is a kind of market free riding, but due to the
reductions of the 2nd pillar size, we should be less constrained by this circumstance.
The another regulatory option, independent of the portfolio management style, is
applying the reverse auctions in this industry which should lead to the substantial cut
of the fees charged by the PFs. The promising experiences from Chile and Peru show
it can be the right track and the recent research (Kurach, Kusmierczyk, & Papla,
2017) additionally supports this view.
Notes
1. Also called ‘notional’ instead of ‘non-financial’.
2. An international comparison of PF performance on a risk adjusted basis can be also
found in (Antolin, 2008).
3. Due to the acquisition of ‘OFE Warta’ by ‘Allianz Polska OFE’, till September, 19th 2014,
there were 13 OFEs operating in the Polish market. Hence, in our estimates, we ignored
the data for ‘OFE Warta’.
4. Warsaw Stock Exchange
5. http://www.manapensija.lv/en/2017/08/invalda-invl-offers-in-the-latvian-market-new-passive-




We are thankful to two anonymous reviewers for their constructive remarks on an earlier
version of this manuscript. All remaining errors are our own.
Disclosure statement
This project was financed using the sources of the National Science Centre (Poland) granted




Andonov, A., Bauer, R., & Cremers, M. (2012). Can large pension funds beat the market?
Asset allocation, market timing, security selection, and the limits of liquidity. Netspar
Discussion Paper (10/2012-062).
Antolin, P. (2008). OECD Working Papers on Insurance and Private Pensions, 20.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 381
Bhattacharjee, K., & Roy, B. (2012). Fund performance measurement without benchmark – A
case of select indian mutual funds. International Journal of Information Technology and
Business Management, 5(1),12–19.
Blake, D. (2006). Pension Economics. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Blake, D., & Board, J. (2000). Measuring value added in the pensions industry. Geneva Papers
on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, 25(4),539–567. doi:10.1111/1468-0440.00081
Bohl, M. T., Lischewski, J., & Voronkova, S. (2011). Pension Funds’ performance in strongly
regulated industries in Central Europe: Evidence from Poland and Hungary. Emerging
Markets Finance and Trade, 47(Suppl 3),80–94. doi:10.2753/REE1540-496X4704S305
Borges, M. R. (2010). Efficient market hypothesis in European stock markets. The European
Journal of Finance, 16(7),711–726. doi:10.1080/1351847X.2010.495477
Cheung, Y.-W., & Lai, K. S. (1995). A search for long memory in international stock market
returns. Journal of International Money and Finance, 14(4),597–615. doi:10.1016/0261-5606
(95)93616-U
Chybalski, F. (2011a). The choice of Open Pension Fund made by Citizens of Poland in
the Years 2003–2009: The Analysis of the criteria. The Pensions Institute Discussion Paper
(PI-1102).
Chybalski, F. (2011b). The Resilience of Pension Systems in the CEE Countries to Financial
and Economic Crisis: the Need for Higher Diversification. 13th International Conference on
Finance and Banking Proceedings, (pp. 258–67). Ostrava.
Clare, A., Sherman, M. B., & Thomas, S. (2016). Multi-asset class mutual funds: Can they time
the market? Evidence from the US, UK and Canada. Research in International Business and
Finance, 36, 212–221.doi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2015.09.011
Cremers, M., Ferreira, M. A., Matos, P., & Starks, L. (2016). Indexing and active fund
management: International evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 120(3),539–560. doi:
10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.02.008
Departament Nadzoru Inwestycji Emerytalnych (2012). Kryterium oceny efektywnosci
inwestycyjnej OFE, system motywacyjny PTE oraz minimalny wymog kapitałowy dla PTE.
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